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Ross: Parental Rights Issues Involving Education

THE CONTEMPORARY SIGNIFICANCE OF M EYER AND PIERCE
FOR PARENTAL RIGHTS ISSUES INVOLVING EDUCATION
by
William G. Ross*
The appropriate relationship between government and parents in the education of
children is an issue that has created recorded controversy since Plato advocated the
communal rearing of children. The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed this issue in two
landmark decisions during the 1920s in which the Court forcefully declared that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of parents to direct the
education of their offspring.1
In the first case, Meyer v. Nebraska in 1923, the Court held that several state
statutes prohibiting the teaching of German to elementary school children interfered with
“the power of parents to control the education of their own.”2 The statutes, enacted in the
wake of the First World War for the stated purpose of ensuring the assimilation of GermanAmericans who lived in isolated ethnic enclaves, were motivated in large measure by the
nativism and xenophobia that swept the nation in the years immediately following the war.3

*

Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University. A.B., Stanford, 1976; J.D.,
Harvard, 1979. Professor Ross is the author of a book about the Meyer and Pierce decisions,
FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM , EDUCATION AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927 (1994).
1

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510

2

Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401.

3

See WILLIAM G. ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM , EDUCATION, AND THE
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The Court’s opinion observed that the Platonic guardianship of children was at odds with
American concepts of liberty. 4 In its earliest recognition that due process embraces human
rights as well as economic rights, the Court in Meyer observed in dictum that “the
individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected.”5 Although the Court
explained that the meaning of liberty within the Fourteenth Amendment cannot be defined
“with exactness," the Court declared that these liberties include, but are not necessarily
limited to, “the right to marry, establish a home, and bring up children.”6 These are moving
words – among the most eloquent in the Court's canon. Their meaning, however, remains
enigmatic.
In the second case, Pierce v. Society of the Sisters in 1925, the Court struck down
an Oregon statute that required all children to attend public elementary school. The law,
which was part of a national campaign for compulsory public elementary education, was
animated by anti-Catholicism and probably would have resulted in the closing of all
comprehensive non-public schools since few parents would have sent their children to both
full-time public and private schools.7 The Court held that the statute “unreasonably

CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at 57-95 (1994).
4

262 U.S. at 401-02.

5

Id. at 401.

6

Id. at 399.

7

See ROSS, supra note 3, at 134-59.
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interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control.”8 The Court explained that:
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State
to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction
from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him
for additional obligations.9
Despite their ringing declarations about human rights, Meyer and Pierce were both
formally decided largely on the basis of property rights -- the liberty of the schools to
conduct a business, the right of private school teachers to follow their occupation, and the
freedom of the schools and the parents to enter into contracts.10 Although the Court easily
could have decided the cases on the bases of freedom of religion or freedom of speech,11
the Court had not yet incorporated any part of the Bill of Rights into state law, and it was not
prepared to begin the process of incorporation in these cases.12

8

268 U.S. at 534-35.

9

Id. at 535.

10

See ROSS, supra note 3, at 186-87.

11

As Justice Kennedy recently observed, “Pierce and Meyer, had they been decided in recent
times, may well have been grounded upon First Amendment principles protecting freedom of speech,
belief, and religion.” Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2076 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
12

ROSS, supra note 3, at 189-91. Meyer and Pierce may be seen as a bridge to incorporation,
however, insofar as they were, for all practical purposes, the first decisions in which the Court struck
down state legislation that interfered with personal liberties. The Court began the process of
incorporation only seven days after it decided Pierce when it stated in dictum in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925), that the First Amendment’s protection of free speech and the press is
3
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The Court’s reliance upon substantive due process was consistent with its suspicion
of social and economic regulatory legislation. But while the Court rejected the arguments
of the states that only public education could instill democratic values in children, the Court
did not deny that the states had a compelling need to foster such values in youth. This
accommodation of the rights of the parents and the needs of the state seemed to strike an
appropriate balance at the time, and the decisions received widespread popular approval,
for they seemed to offer something to everyone.13 Ethnic Americans hailed the decision as
a strike against nativism,14 liberals welcomed the Court’s defense of human rights,15 and
economic conservatives correctly perceived that the decisions would discourage growing
efforts by progressives to curb the Court’s power.16 Coming at a time when the nativism
that had motivated the statutes was waning, the decisions abruptly terminated a
widespread compulsory public education movement.

incorporated into state law. See ROSS, supra note 3, at 191-97.
13

Although Pierce was unanimously decided, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., and George
Sutherland dissented in Meyer on the ground that the statutes did not unduly restrict the freedom of
either the teachers or the students because the laws were a reasonable and perhaps necessary means of
achieving the desirable state interest of having citizens use a common language. Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 3990, 412-13 (1923). For a discussion of these dissents, see ROSS, supra note 3, at 13032.
14

See ROSS, supra note 3, at 172-73.

15

Id. at 195-96.

16

Id. at 193-95. See also WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES
AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890-1937, at 246-49, 286-87 (1994).

4
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The decisions may therefore be more controversial today than they were 75 years
ago. Like many other judicial decisions, Meyer and Pierce have had unforeseen and
indeed strange doctrinal consequences. Beginning almost immediately after Pierce, the
Court suspended its use of substantive due process in personal liberties cases in favor of
selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Although, after 1937, the Court rejected even in
economic cases the substantive due process theory upon which Meyer and Pierce are
based, the decisions provided the cornerstone for the Court’s revival of substantive due
process in the context of personal liberties during the 1960s and 1970s.17 The
conservative Lutherans and Roman Catholics who challenged the laws that the Court struck
down in Meyer and Pierce might not have hailed the Court so heartily for saving their
schools if they could have known that these decisions would provide the foundation for the
Court’s enunciation of a right to privacy that culminated in Roe v. Wade. Cultural
conservatives today may disdain the use of these decisions in support of abortion rights,
but they hail Meyer and Pierce as the cornerstone of parental rights.18 Meanwhile, many

17

See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating anti-abortion statute); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating statute that prohibited use of contraceptives).
18

For example, while this paper was being revised after the conference, courts relied upon
Pierce in two major decisions involving parental rights. In Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054
(2000), the U.S. Supreme Court cited Meyer and Pierce to support its decision to invalidate a state
law that allowed a court to permit grandparents to visit a grandchild more than the parent wished to
authorize. See also infra note 72 and accompanying text. In another recent decision, the Eleventh
Circuit cited Pierce’s recognition of the importance of the parent-child relationship in support of its
decision affirming the dismissal of a claim that the Immigration and Naturalization Service denied due
process to a six-year-old alien by dismissing his asylum application as void on the ground that the minor
lacked the capacity to seek asylum without his father’s consent. Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338
5
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liberals who may approve of the privacy doctrines for which Meyer and Pierce provide the
foundation believe that the decisions unduly diminish the rights of children. From a feminist
perspective, some scholars have criticized the decisions for reinforcing patriarchy. 19
Few critics of Meyer and Pierce today are motivated by the antagonism against
ethnic Americans and Roman Catholicism that animated the legislation that Meyer and
Pierce nullified. Like the proponents of that legislation, however, some people today
continue to view non-public schooling with suspicion because they believe that non-public
education tends to promote racial, economic, and cultural divisiveness that contravenes the
interest of both the state and the child.
Some critics of private education have even gone so far as to revive the prospect of
compulsory public education. These critics point out that the decisions were based in part
upon a now-discredited theory of economic due process. Moreover, they remind us that
there may have been more latitude for parental control over education during the 1920s,
when education was less important than it is today. Stricter enforcement of truancy laws,
racial integration of schools, and abolition of child labor are all expressions of changed
attitudes toward education's importance. Mark Tushnet has suggested that the shaky

(11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 2737 (2000). See also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL
FATE 239-40 (1982); ROSS, supra note 3, at 190-91.
19

See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM . & MARY L. REV. 995, 996-1001, 1112-22 (1992). Professor
Woodhouse has argued that the decisions aggrandize private rights at the expense of community values
and constitutionalized “a patriarchal notion of parental rights” that “interrupted the trend of family law
moving toward children’s rights.” Id. at 1113.

6
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substantive due process grounds on which Pierce is based might permit Congress,
pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, to prohibit private schools on the
ground that they unduly interfere with “society’s ability to reach a point of integration where
judgments about people’s worth are made solely on the basis of individual merit.”20
Similarly, Abner Greene has stated that compulsory public education “would ensure that all
children are exposed to multiple sources of authority and knowledge” and “would free up
funds used for private schooling and would direct parental energies at improving the public
schools.”21 And James S. Liebman has suggested that public education be compulsory to
the extent that parents who have religious objections could elect to remove their children.22
These criticisms of Pierce are part of a broader assault on parental rights.
Professor James G. Dwyer has argued that parental child-rearing rights are illegitimate

20

Mark Tushnet, Public and Private Education: Is There a Constitutional Difference?,
1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 54 (1991). Professor Tushnet contends that “[t]hat justification is more
substantial than the one offered in Pierce, and it might be sufficient to overcome the weakened
protection given substantive due process rights by the Court’s analysis” in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state statute prohibiting sodomy).
21

Abner S. Greene, Why Vouchers are Unconstitutional, and Why They’re Not, 13 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 397, 407 (1999).
22

James S. Liebman, Voice Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 307 (1991) (reviewing JOHN E.
CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA’S SCHOOLS (1990)). Professor
Liebman explains that “[b]y curtailing exit from public schools except by the few citizens whose religious
beliefs require them to exit organized society, the states could stem enough . . . escape to promote
genuine voice-activated educational reform and simultaneously extend a civic education to all young
people whose coming participation in the larger society requires it.” Id.

7
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and that parents should enjoy only a “legal privilege to care for and make decisions on
behalf of children in ways that are not contrary to the children’s best interests.”23
Contemporary criticisms of Meyer and Pierce, however, do not diminish the
enduring significance of the decisions for human rights. Even though the Court abandoned
economic due process after 1937, the Court’s growing solicitude for personal liberties
indicates that the Court would reach the same result today. Now, however, a court would
probably hold that the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause compels the state to
permit parents to have the option to send their children to a sectarian school. To the extent
that the right of parents to prefer a sectarian school to a public school is now presumably
guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause, that right is probably more secure than it was at
the time of Pierce. Insofar as a parent’s right to send his child to a private, non-sectarian
school must remain grounded in generic due process, however, the right is vulnerable to
complaints against the non-textual vagueness of substantive due process. In contrast to
Meyer's attorney, who in his autobiography hailed the Meyer decision for its vision of a
"fenceless land of liberty," 24 many critics of the opinion would prefer to confine liberty within
at least some fences, particularly if the Supreme Court is going to be the ultimate surveyor
of liberty’s terrain.

23

James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of
Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1447 (1994). See also JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS
SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN ’S RIGHTS (1998).
24

ROSS, supra note 3, at 192 (citing ARTHUR F. MULLEN, WESTERN DEMOCRAT 226

(1940)).

8
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Although substantive due process invites excessive judicial activism, and even
though courts during the past twenty years have exhibited little willingness to expand the
parameters of substantive due process, the doctrine that there are certain rights that are
not specifically mentioned in the Constitution seems likely to remain secure because there
are certain unwritten rights that most Americans believe to exist. If indeed there are any
fundamental rights that are not spelled out in the Constitution, then many persons – myself
included – would count among these the right of a parent to exercise a high level of control
over a child’s education, for child-rearing involves the most intimate aspects of one’s life
and is a critical expression of personal autonomy.
The Supreme Court recently re-affirmed the vitality of Meyer and Pierce in its
decision in Troxel v. Granville, which nullified a Washington statute that permitted state
courts to exercise broad discretion to override parental decisions concerning the visits of
third parties with their children.25 Citing Meyer and Pierce, Justice O’Connor’s plurality
opinion declared that “[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case – the interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children – is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests recognized by this Court.” 26
But while Troxel demonstrates the continuing significance of Meyer and Pierce, it
also illustrates the continuing enigma of those decisions. Although Justice Kennedy
correctly pointed out in his dissent that all of the Justices seemed to agree that a “custodial

25

Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060 (2000).

26

Id.

9
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parent has a constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by the state, how
best to raise, nurture and educate the child,”27 various members of the Court interpreted
this right in different ways. Both the four-justice plurality opinion and Justice Souter’s
concurring opinion relied heavily upon Meyer and Pierce to argue that parents have a
powerful interest in controlling their children’s personal associations.28 As Justice Souter
acknowledged in his concurring opinion, however, the Court’s decisions “have not set out
exact metes and bounds to the protected interest of a parent in the relationship with his
child.”29 Therefore, it is not surprising, as Justice Thomas pointed out in his concurrence,
in which he argued in favor of strict scrutiny, that the opinions of the Court and of Justice
Souter did not articulate a standard of review for legislation that interferes with the parental
rights enunciated by Meyer and Pierce.30

27

Id. at 2076 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

28

Id. at 2060; id. at 2066 (Souter, J., concurring). As Justice Souter stated:
Meyer’s repeatedly recognized right of upbringing would be a sham if it failed to
encompass the right to be free of judicially compelled visitation by “any party” at “any
time” a judge believed he “could make a ‘better’ decision” than the objecting parent had
done. The strength of a parent’s interest in controlling a child’s associates is as obvious
as the influence of personal associations on the development of the child’s social and
moral character.

Id. at 2066-67. Souter also concluded that Pierce implied that “parental choice in such matters is not
merely a default rule in the absence of either governmental choice or the government’s designation of an
official with the power to choose for whatever reason and in whatever circumstances.” Troxel, 120 S.
Ct. at 2067.
29

Id. at 2066 (Souter, J., concurring).

30

Id. at 2068 (Thomas, J., concurring).

10
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Although Justice Scalia’s dissent acknowledges that parents have fundamental
rights to “direct the upbringing of their children,” Justice Scalia contends that the Court
lacks power to nullify legislation that infringes on those rights.31 Pointing out that Meyer,
Pierce, and Wisconsin v. Yoder32 are the only decisions in which the Court had relied “in
whole or in part upon a substantive constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing of
their children,” Justice Scalia contends that the “sheer diversity” of the opinions in Troxel
persuaded him that “the theory of unenumerated parental rights underlying [Meyer, Pierce,
and Yoder] has small claim to stare decisis protection. A legal principle that can be
thought to produce such diverse outcomes in the relatively simple case before us here is
not a legal principle that has induced substantial reliance.”33 Similarly, Justice Kennedy’s
dissent argues that, while the principle of parental rights as articulated by Meyer and
Pierce exists “in broad formulation,” the “courts must use considerable restraint, including
careful adherence to the incremental instruction given by the precise facts of particular
cases, as they seek to give further and more precise definition to the right.”34
While Pierce therefore clearly provides a constitutional foundation for some type of
parental rights, the scope of those rights remains unclear. Certainly parental rights are far

31

Id. at 2074 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

32

406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that enforcement of state law requiring school attendance past
the eighth grade violated the free exercise rights of the Amish).
33

Troxel, 120 S. Ct. at 2074 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia also observed that Meyer and
Pierce were “from an era rich in substantive due process holdings that have since been repudiated.” Id.
34

Id. at 2076.

11
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from absolute. Clearly there are some limits on a parent’s right to control a child’s
education, or else, as one court has observed, “a truant’s parent could plausibly proclaim
that he or she was exercising his or her right while ‘home-schooling’ the child to be a safecracker or prostitute.”35 Moreover, the language in Pierce stating that "the child is not the
mere creature of the state"36 may withhold more parental autonomy than it confers, for the
use of the word “mere”could be read to suggest that the child is primarily the creature of the
state. If the Court had believed that parental powers were generally paramount to
governmental powers, the Court might have stated that "the child is not primarily the
creature of the state." 37 The Court’s decision in Pierce also declared that the state had the
right to regulate non-public schools,38 a right that the non-public schools that opposed

35

Hubbard v. Buffalo Indep. Sch. Dist., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1015 (W.D. Tex. 1998)
(holding that a school district’s policy of requiring students who transferred from non-accredited or
home schools to pass proficiency tests at their own expense did not burden free exercise of religion).
36

Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).

37

If the Court had regarded the rights of the parent as paramount, the Court likewise might have
stated that “the child is not the mere creature of the parent,” although there would have been little point
in using this language since the decision was directed against the power of the state rather than the
power of the parent. The Court’s use of the word “mere,” however, must be read in the context of the
Court’s seemingly broad declaration of parental rights: “those who nurture [the child] and direct his
destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.” 268 U.S. at 535.
38

The Court stated that:
[n]o question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate
all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to
require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be
of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly
essential to good citizenship be taught, and that nothing be taught which is
12
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compulsory education had acknowledged and indeed emphasized in support of their
position. 39
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has never specifically stated that the right of
parents to direct the education of their children is actually a “fundamental” right that would
trigger strict judicial scrutiny of legislation that affects that right. The determination of the
scope of the parental right to educate children is further complicated because the Court
has refused to categorize education itself as a fundamental right.40 Accordingly, there is no
clear standard of review that a federal court must apply in reviewing legislation that affects
the rights of parents to direct the education of their children.41 The First Circuit has recently
pointed out that the Supreme Court “has yet to decide whether the right to direct the
upbringing and education of one’s children is among those fundamental rights whose
infringement merits heightened scrutiny.”42 Accordingly, the Second Circuit has held that

manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
268 U.S. at 534.
39

ROSS, supra note 3, at 163 (citing oral argument in the Pierce case). Opponents of a
compulsory public education movement in Michigan during the early 1920s tried to discourage
campaigns against non-public schools by promoting legislation to require closer state supervision of nonpublic schools. Id. at 140-41.
40

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
41

As one commentator recently observed, “[c]onfusion and inconsistency reign as to the proper
standards for judicial review.” Eric W. Schulze, The Constitutional Right of Parents to Direct the
Education of Their Children, 138 EDUC. L. REP . 583, 587 (1999).
42

Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995).

13
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parents lack a fundamental right to direct their children’s education and that “rational basis
review is appropriate” in cases in which parents seek to exempt their children from
educational procedures.43 Although legislation presumably is subject to a heightened
standard of review when parents claim that public school practices infringe upon their
religious rights as well as their parental rights, the level of scrutiny even here is unclear.44
The situation is further complicated by a number of state court decisions that indicate that
education is a fundamental right under state constitutions.45
Since both federal and state courts have generally refused to read Pierce as
conferring a fundamental right upon parents that would trigger strict scrutiny of legislation
affecting parental rights, parental rights advocates recently have unsuccessfully sponsored
parental-rights amendments in Congress and in numerous states. A parental-rights
amendment was defeated in a 1996 initiative in Colorado by a margin of 58 to 42
percent.46 These proposed amendments typically track the language of Pierce by
asserting the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control. Although advocates of amendments based on the language of

43

Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461 (2d Cir. 1996).

44

As one commentator has pointed out, when courts are “faced with hybrid claims asserting
violations of both parental and religious constitutional rights, another layer of inconsistency and confusion
is added to the judicial mix.” Schulze, supra note 41, at 596.
45

See Kelly Thompson Cochran, Comment, Beyond School Financing: Defining the
Constitutional Right to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 399, 401-02 (2000).
46

Jean Hellwege, Parents Seek Control Over Children’s Lives in Legislatures, Courts,
TRIAL, May 1999, at 15.

14
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Pierce contend that an amendment would merely codify Pierce, such amendments would
interfere with the subtle balance between parental rights and the rights of the state which
have been worked out since Pierce by impeding efforts to curtail child abuse and providing
more impetus for school vouchers.47 A parental-rights amendment also would be
superfluous since many statutes already contain parental-rights provisions.48
Moreover, such amendments might unduly interfere with the power of school officials
to make curriculum decisions and provide parents with a virtual veto over curriculum that
they find objectionable. This would allow a minority of parents the power to overrule the
decisions of elected officials, thereby substituting a crude form of direct democracy for
republican government. Such a veto power would interfere with the curricular preferences
of a majority of parents, thereby interfering with their right to direct their children’s education

47

Judith Schaeffer, Deputy Legal Director for People for the American Way, has stated that
“[a] blanket constitutional amendment that says parents have a constitutional right to direct the
upbringing of their children sounds innocuous, but it’s a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Good parents don’t
need it, and bad parents would abuse it.” Id. at 13-14.
48

For example, Texas law provides specific rights to parents, including the right to review all
teaching materials used in the classroom, the right to file a grievance to be heard by the school board,
and a limited right of prior consent before a child may be videotaped by a school employee. TEX .
EDUC. CODE ANN. § 26.001-26.012 (West 1995).

15
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by sending them to public schools.49 These amendments also might violate the
constitutional rights of teachers to teach and students to learn.50
Similarly, the amendments would pose a perennial threat of litigation that would tend
to encourage school administrators to dilute the curriculum, reaching for the lowest
common denominator of public sensibilities.51 The danger of more litigation might be
particularly potent because a parental-rights amendment might shift the standard of judicial
scrutiny of governmental interference with parental rights from the “rational basis” standard
that is presently used in most cases to an intermediate standard, or even to a compellinginterest test.
In the absence of a more compelling standard of review of government action that
affects parental rights, Pierce has generally not enabled public school parents to persuade
courts to permit them to remove their children from practices and programs to which they
object.52 The Supreme Court’s anomalous decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder is the only

49

See Jennifer L. Sabourin, Note, Parental Rights Amendments: Will a Statutory Right to
Parent Force Children to “‘Shed Their Constitutional Rights’ at the Schoolhouse Door?,” 44
WAYNE L. REV. 1899, 1917, 1920, (1999). As Ms. Sabourin has pointed out, “[p]arents only have a
constitutional right in directing their own children and not the children of other parents.” Id. at 1920.
50

Id. at 1923.

51

Id. at 1920.

52

As one commentator has observed, “[t]he federal courts narrowly have restricted Meyer,
Pierce, and Yoder to the facts of those cases. The courts are unwilling to grant parents any general
power to select the educational requirements with which they will or will not comply, under the rubric of
the constitutional right of parents to direct the education of their children.” Schulze, supra note 41, at
596.

16
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education decision in which Pierce has been successfully invoked. In one much publicized
case in which parents objected to a sexually-explicit AID S awareness assembly that their
children were required to attend, the First Circuit stated that Pierce does not provide “a
fundamental constitutional right to dictate the curriculum at the public school to which they
have chosen to send their children . . . . If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right
to dictate individually what the schools teach their children, the schools would be forced to
cater a curriculum for each student whose parents had genuine moral disagreements with
the school’s choice of subject matter.”53 In other similar decisions, federal courts have held
that parents of public school children had no constitutional basis for objecting to the
administration of psychological counseling to a third grader;54 the imposition of corporal
punishment on a sixth grader;55 a mandatory sex education program;56a compulsory
community service program;57 mandatory academic achievement testing;58 and a period
for silent meditation or prayer not exceeding one minute.59

53

Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533-34 (1st Cir. 1995).
The Court declared that “[w]e cannot see that the Constitution imposes such a burden on state
educational systems, and accordingly find that the rights of parents as described by Meyer and Pierce
do not encompass a broad-based right to restrict the flow of information in the public schools.” Id. at
534.
54

Newkirk v. East Lansing Pub. Sch., 57 F.3d 1070 (6th Cir. 1995).

55

Baker v. Owen, 395 F.Supp. 294, 299 (M.D.N.C. 1975), aff’d without opinion, 423 U.S.
907 (1975).
56

Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F.Supp. 340, 344 (D.C. Md. 1969), aff’d, 428 F.2d
471, 472 (4th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
57

Immediato v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 461-62 (2d Cir. 1996).
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Courts also have rejected parental objections to public school practices and
curriculum even in cases in which parents have relied both on parental rights and the free
exercise of religion. In its controversial decision in Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of
Education, the Sixth Circuit, for example, rejected efforts by parents to have their children
opt out of reading a textbook that contained passages that were deeply offensive to
fundamentalist Christians. The Court held that mere exposure to this curriculum did not
unconstitutionally burden the free exercise of religion.60
One of the most troubling aspects of Mozert is that the curriculum that the parents
challenged may have marginalized the religious beliefs of the parents because its
numerous references to religion virtually ignored Christianity, particularly Protestantism.
Two of the judges on the panel aptly expressed regret that the school board could not have
done more to accommodate the needs of the parents who objected to the curriculum.
Nevertheless, they rather ruefully acknowledged that the parents’ remedy was political
rather than judicial. As one of the judges explained, “[a] constitutional challenge to the
content of instruction . . . is a challenge to the notion of a politically-controlled school
system.”61

58

Hubbard v. Buffalo Indep. Sch. Dist., 20 F.Supp. 2d 1012, 1017 (W.D. Tex. 1998).

59

Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F.Supp. 337, 346 (D. Mass. 1976).

60

Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).

61

Id. at 1079 (Boggs, J., concurring).
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It is not difficult to collect examples of public school curricula to which reasonable
parents might object. To one degree or another, many schools have succumbed to the
latest trends in political correctness and/or to promoting sexual license. All too many
criticisms of the public schools, however, begin with an anecdote about a loony curriculum
and conclude with the non sequitur that public schools as a class are irredeemably
depraved. Curricular abuses are inevitable when tens of millions of children attend tens of
thousands of public schools. While many parents clearly have legitimate objections to
public school curriculum, the ability of the political system to accommodate parental
concerns about public school curriculum is demonstrated by the fact that the percentage of
students enrolled in private schools has decreased among all economic groups during the
past twenty years. As one commentator recently observed, “[i]f Americans now vote with
their feet, they typically do so by moving toward public schools, not away from them.”62 The
continued strength of the public school is all the more remarkable since the burgeoning
prosperity of the past two decades has made parents more capable than ever before of
paying for non-public education.
In some ways, the public schools have been the victims of their own success, for
their increasing ability to draw and hold children of all abilities and social classes has
created cultural tensions. As Professor Minow has observed, “the disillusionment with the
public schools began at just about the same time that these schools took on the task of

62

Richard Rothstein, Lessons; An Allegiance to Public Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2000,

at B11.
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educating all children, including those with disabilities and limited English proficiency, noncitizens, the homeless, and migrants.”63 Critics of the public schools should beware the
danger of succumbing to the “Miniver Cheevey syndrome” by romanticizing a golden age of
public education that never existed. The public schools of yore were not necessarily more
orderly or educationally efficient than are today’s institutions, and their classrooms were
segregated by race and were devoid of the physically and mentally challenged as well as
many of the poor, particularly those children who sacrificed formal education to labor in
factories, farms, and mines.
The argument that parents lack sufficient control over the education that their
children receive in public schools is quite ironic since the public school is probably more
amenable to grassroots democracy than is any other arm of government. Parents
obviously could assert more control over the public schools if they became more involved in
parent-teacher organizations or school board elections. At the very least they could vote in
school board elections – a right that only approximately ten percent of all parents now
exercise.64 Since parents constitute a numerically large and generally prosperous
segment of the electorate, they obviously are no discrete and insular minority. Although
parents therefore have the power to influence political decisions concerning school

63

Martha Minow, Choice or Commonality: Welfare and Schooling After the End of
Welfare as We Knew It, 49 DUKE L.J. 493, 503 (1999).
64

Hellwege, supra note 45, at 15.

20

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol34/iss1/6

20

Ross: Parental Rights Issues Involving Education

curriculum, they also have vast ability to influence legal proceedings involving curricular
issues.65
Moreover, the ability of parents to influence the schools that their children attend
may be expanding. Educators have long since rejected the model of centralization in the
hands of educational experts, the so-called “one best system.” Some schools are now
using so-called school-based management initiatives, which delegate decision-making
authority over budget, personnel, and curriculum to councils of teachers, parents, and
administrators at the local level.66

Other reformers have suggested the creation of a so-

called community engagement dialogic model, analogous to the process of alternative
dispute resolution, in which a mediator would attempt to engage parents in a deliberative
process that would work out compromises that would be broadly acceptable to various
competing factions of parents, administrators, teachers, and students.67 Throughout the
nation, local school districts seem increasingly willing to hear and, when possible,
accommodate the needs and concerns of parents. Charter schools, despite some
drawbacks, also offer exciting possibilities for improving public education through
initiatives that allow parents to exercise more control over their childrens’ education.68

65

Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Passing of the Cardozo Generations, 34 AKRON L. REV. (in this

volume).
66

Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts: A
Dialogic Approach to Education Reform, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 99, 102 (1996).
67

Id. at 114-68.

68

See Molly O’Brien, Free at Last? Charter Schools and the “Deregulated” Curriculum,
34 AKRON L. REV. (in this volume).
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Indeed, the ability of parents to influence public school boards may, in many
instances, actually provide parents with more control over their children’s education than
they would have if they sent their children to private schools. The burgeoning of the homeschool movement suggests in part that many parents believe that even private schools do
not provide parents with sufficient control over their children’s education. At the very
minimum, parents who send children to private schools must acquiesce at least in part to
practices or curricula of which they do not wholly approve. To the extent that parents are
not able to effect changes in the public schools, they retain the right under Pierce to remove
their children from the public schools even though the exercise of this right has obvious
costs.
In addition to ignoring the political rights of parents, discussions of parental rights to
direct their children’s education also tend to overlook the rather obvious fact that parents
have a vast opportunity to educate their children when school is out of session – as it is
most of the time. American children attend school only approximately six hours per day, five
days per week, 36 weeks per year. This means that more than 80 percent of a child's
waking hours is spent away from school. During this time, parents have almost complete
control over the company in which their children will spend their time and the type of
influences to which the child will be exposed. Moreover, parents have full control of a
child’s education during the first five years of a child’s life – the years that presumably are
the most formative in a child’s life. It is a misnomer to equate education with institutional
schooling; most schooling is home schooling. The home especially provides a forum for
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transmitting cultural values that is at least as effective as the school, since so much of the
time of public and non-public schools is taken up with technical learning that lacks any
specific value content – for example, phonics and arithmetic. To the extent that parents
object to the public school curriculum (without objecting so much that they wish to remove
their children from public school), they have ample opportunity to provide antidotes at home
and in their religious institutions during evenings, weekends, holidays, and summers.
The opportunities of parents to instill values in their children at home and in their
religious institutions has long been recognized by persons who have defended the
Supreme Court’s decision prohibiting prayer in the public schools 69 against critics who
alleged that it would subvert the religious and moral training of youth. As President John F.
Kennedy stated in defense of that decision, “we can pray a good deal more at home, we
can attend our churches with a good deal more fidelity, and we can make the true meaning
of prayer much more important in the lives of our children. That power is very much open to
us. And I hope that, as a result of this decision, . . . all American parents will intensify their
efforts at home.”70
One cannot, of course, deny that schools have a very powerful influence in shaping
the values of children. Students obviously react to peer pressure, and they naturally tend to
respect their teachers. Even though public school children spend most of their time outside
of school, they obviously spend a very significant amount of their time in the custody of the

69

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

70

JOHN HERBERT LAUBACH, SCHOOL PRAYERS: CONGRESS, THE COURTS, AND THE PUBLIC 2
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state. The power of the state to communicate its values to public school children has
influenced Stephen Gilles’s interesting argument that public school instruction is a form of
parental speech that is protected by the First Amendment and that the laws that the Court
nullified in Meyer and Pierce constituted restrictions on such speech.71 Although Meyer
and Pierce obviously recognize that parents have constitutional rights to exercise control
over the content of their childrens' education, these decisions do not support the theory that
parents do not delegate some of their autonomy to the state when they send their children
to public school. Because it is impossible for the public schools to accommodate all
parental opinions, a theory that the schools are direct agents of the state would permit
parents to interfere with public school curricula in a manner that might create a chaotic
cacophony in public school classrooms.
Although some parents might argue that they are unable to counter the baneful
influence of teachers and peers in the public schools, I suspect that most objections to
public school curricula involve what is omitted rather than what is taught. In other words,

(1969).
71

Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
937, 1016-22 (1996). Professor Gilles argues that “[p]arents are no less ‘speakers’ for First
Amendment purposes when they communicate indirectly with their children through the speech of
schools, teachers, home tutors, or other educational intermediaries.” Id. at 1016. Professor Gilles
points out that while “[p]arents remain free to teach what they like when their child is in school . . . there
are only so many hours in the day. Six hours a day, five days a week, nine months a year, only the
public school’s values may be communicated to one’s child” Id. at 1022. He believes that “[t]his de
facto prohibition unquestionably constitutes a major curtailment of dissenting parental . . . speech.” Id.
Gilles cites Meyer and Pierce in support of his argument. Id. at 1020-23. For discussions of other
theories on how these decisions can be interpreted in terms of free speech, see supra, note 18.
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the principal objection of parents is not that their children are learning anything harmful, but
that they are not sufficiently exposed to much that is helpful and healthy.
For example, I have heard some parents complain that the American history
curriculum of many public schools devotes so much attention to women and racial
minorities that it ignores many of the white men who once virtually monopolized the
curriculum. Not one of these persons, however, has expressed any objection to having
children learn about the contributions of women and racial minorities to American history.
Indeed, they are happy that the schools are finally teaching about the contributions of
persons and groups whom the public schools unfairly ignored for so long. Their quarrel is
strictly one of emphasis. They do not feel that their children are learning too much about
George Washington Carver, but they wish that they would learn more about George
Washington. To the extent that these parents are unwilling or unable to persuade the
school boards to effect the balance that they prefer, they have a rather easy remedy:
provide instruction at home that fills in the gaps left by the public school curriculum. I
suspect, however, that many of the parents who complain the most vociferously about the
deficiencies of the public schools fail to provide their children with salubrious supplements
when their children are at home. Several months ago, the Arts and Entertainment Network
aired a splendid new film, The Crossing, about Washington’s crossing of the Delaware
River to fight the battle that turned the tide of the American Revolution. The film celebrated
patriotic values in a manner that would warm the most conservative of hearts. But I would
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guess that the number of children who were tuned into smutty and vacuous TV and video
programs was greater than the number who watched The Crossing.
Moreover, the lamentable decline in the standards of instruction for youth at many
religious institutions during recent decades provides an example of how many religious
parents fail to take advantage of opportunities to educate their children outside of the
public schools. It is difficult to sympathize with complaints about the cultural deficiencies of
the public schools when all too many religious institutions fail to adequately instruct young
people in the morals, doctrines, history, and liturgies of their faith.
The abundant opportunities for education at home and in private religious
institutions may explain why many public schools seem to emphasize multi-culturalism
rather the cultures of the numerically dominant groups in the community. The schools
naturally expect the parents to teach the children about their own traditions at home. If the
child does not learn about other cultures at school however, she probably will not learn
about them at home. For example, the parents in Mozert presumably had considerable
opportunity to expose their children at home and at church to their Protestant heritage, if
they had been willing to take the time and make the effort. It is unlikely, however, that the
parents would have taught the children much about other traditions if the children had not
been exposed to these at school. Although the school’s neglect of the children’s own
religion may have made the children feel marginalized, the parents presumably could have
made their children understand that the schools were emphasizing the culture of other
groups because it was the duty of the parents to instill in them knowledge and pride about
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their own heritage, while the schools had the ability to teach about cultures with which their
parents were unfamiliar.
Indeed, the ability of schools to teach students about a wide spectrum of cultures
was at the heart of Meyer and Pierce, for the proponents of the nativistic legislation in both
of those cases argued that the parochial schools instilled impressionable youth with alien
values. The Court’s decision in Meyer explicitly held that the teaching of German in
parochial schools did not necessarily promote political subversion or exclude instruction in
“American” values.72 Similarly, the Court in Pierce implicitly found that religion-based
schools did not necessarily fail to provide a sound education in secular subjects or neglect
the inculcation of patriotism.73 As a Nebraska judge quipped at Robert T. Meyer’s trial
when the state’s attorney asked a pastor whether parochial school graduates could recite
the national anthem, bilingual children “probably beat us in that. They can repeat it in two
languages.”74
Contrary to the widespread popular assumption that parents surrender to the
schools most control over children, courts have recognized that parents retain primary
control over their children in decisions that have refused to find that public schools have an

72

Meyer v. Nebraska 262 U.S. 390, 400, 402 (1923).

73

Pierce v. Society of the Sisters 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).

74

ROSS, supra note 3, at 133 (citing Transcript of Proceedings, Nebraska District v.
Evangelical Lutheran Synod, et al., District Court of Dodge County, Sept. 1, 1921).
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affirmative duty to protect children from harm.75 As the court explained in one decision that
the parents of public schoolchilren:
still retain primary responsibility for feeding, clothing, sheltering, and caring
for the child. By mandating school attendance for children under the age of
sixteen, the state of Illinois has not assumed responsibility for their entire
personal lives; these children and their parents retain substantial freedom to
act. The analogy of a school yard as a prison may be a popular one for
school-age children, but we cannot recognize constitutional duties on a
child’s lament.76
In addition to their relevance to current struggles over parental rights amendments
and curriculum issues, Meyer and Pierce also may be germane to the present controversy
over school vouchers. Voucher advocates appear eager to bring vouchers within the
umbrella of the parental rights enunciated by Meyer and Pierce.77 For example, the
Milwaukee school voucher program that was recently sustained by a Wisconsin court78 is
formally called “the Milwaukee Parental Choice program,” thereby perhaps suggesting that
vouchers permit parents to exercise a constitutional right to choose the school that their
child attends. Some voucher proponents argue that economically disadvantaged parents

75

D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., Nos. 91-1136, 91-1137, 1991 WL
276292, at *6 (3rd Cir. Dec. 31, 1991), vacated, 972 F.2d 1364 (3rd Cir. 1992); J.O. v. Alton
Community Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990). Courts in both decisions dismissed
lawsuits by parents whose children allegedly suffered sexual abuse in a public school.
76

909 F.2d at 272. Accordingly, the court concluded that “[s]choolchildren are not like mental
patients and prisoners such that the state has an affirmative duty to protect them.” Id. at 272-73.
77

As one commentator has argued, Pierce “clearly recognizes the right of choice implicit in the
school vouchers system.” Jill Jasperson, Renaissance in Education: The Constitutionality and
Viability of an Educational Choice or Voucher System, 1993 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 126, 130.
78

Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).
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are unable to avail themselves of the right to direct their childrens’ education insofar as they
cannot afford to send their children to a parochial school.79 But while Pierce indeed
permits parents to choose where to send their children to school, the Constitution does not
compel the state to pay for any form of private education, and it may actually prohibit the
state from paying for parochial education.
Although the Supreme Court has, in several instances, removed financial
impediments to the exercise of rights,80 the Court has held that the government has no
obligation to provide funding to facilitate the exercise of a fundamental right.81 Similarly,
the Court has established that the failure to subsidize a fundamental right does not
constitute a penalty on the exercise of that right. 82
In particular, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that there is no right to abortion
funding.83 The constitutional argument in favor of vouchers for private education is weaker

79

As one commentator has argued, the only parents “who have a meaningful capacity to
exercise their right of choice are those who have the financial means to afford private schooling (or the
time to invest in home schooling) . . . . The public education system thus poses a great danger of
infringing on the liberty of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children.” Andrew A.
Cheng, The Inherent Hostility of Secular Public Education Toward Religion: Why Parental
Choice Best Serves the Core Values of the Religion Clauses, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 697, 733-34
(1997).
80

See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (invalidating fee for filing divorce

petition).
81

Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983).

82

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 &
n.19 (1980).
83

See 500 U.S. 173; Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); 448 U.S.
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than any argument in favor of public funding of abortion insofar as the Court has denied
(however unfortunately) that education is a fundamental right.84 Moreover, a parent who
receives no funds for private schooling is nevertheless able to secure public schooling for
her child, while denial of public funding for a woman’s abortion may completely foreclose
the exercise of her right.
Vouchers have only an attenuated connection to the parental rights and interests
that Meyer and Pierce – and Yoder – were intended to protect. Even though Meyer and
Pierce did not directly address the free exercise implications of these cases, the laws that
the Court nullified in those decisions interfered with the freedom of parents to provide a
religious education for their children.85 Since religious education was inextricably tied to
ethnic heritage, the statutes struck at the very heart of parental efforts to preserve their

297; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
84

See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1 (1973).
85

In Meyer and its companion cases, the parents challenged the constitutionality of the statutes
because instruction in the German language was necessary to enable children to participate in Germanlanguage Lutheran services. See ROSS, supra note 3, at 4, 62, 100. The opponents of the laws based
their challenges in state court largely on the ground of religious freedom, id. at 100-01, but largely
ignored religious issues in their arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court, presumably because they
held little hope for the success of these arguments in the absence of the incorporation of the First
Amendment into state law. See id. at 117-19. Similarly, the Roman Catholic opponents of the Oregon
compulsory public education statute did not emphasize religious freedom issues in their argument before
the Court, even though religious liberty was the issue that animated most Catholic opposition to the
statute. Id. at 169. Like the opponents of the language laws in Meyer, the Catholics correctly
perceived that the Court would have little sympathy for religiously-based arguments. Id. at 169, 18991.

30

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol34/iss1/6

30

Ross: Parental Rights Issues Involving Education

cultural identity. 86 Indeed, the compelling desire of Lutheran and Roman Catholic parents
to educate their children in schools that propagated their religious faith was what motivated
the parents to establish those schools and to challenge the statutes. Likewise, this is what
sustained them in their long, difficult, and expensive struggle to overturn the laws. The
Court’s ruling that parents had a fundamental right to choose the schools that their children
attended and the subjects that they studied constituted a critical landmark in judicial
respect for religious freedom and cultural pluralism.
In contrast, the so-called “choice” that the voucher movement is ostensibly intended
to promote has no apparent direct relation to the protection of any religious beliefs or the
preservation of any cultural identity. Indeed, many parents who are using vouchers insist
that they would much prefer to send their children to neighborhood public schools.87
Rather, the announced goal of the voucher movement is to enable parents whose children
attend sub-standard schools to obtain a better education for their children by providing
them with the option to transfer to a non-public school. In other words, vouchers are
intended to provide economic relief rather than to protect religion or culture.
Of course, it is not always possible to neatly distinguish between economic and noneconomic issues. Indeed, the Meyer and Pierce decisions themselves nicely illustrate this

86

See id. at 1-5, passim. Robert T. Meyer explained to his attorney that he had openly defied
the Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of German because he had a “‘duty to uphold my religion.
Teaching the children the religion of their fathers in the language of their fathers is part of that religion.’”
ROSS, supra note 3 at 4 (citing MULLEN , supra note 24, at 218).
87

Lynette Clemetson & Joan Raymond, A Ticket to Private School, NEWSWEEK , Mar. 27,
2000, at 32.
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point by blurring the distinction between the economic and the non-economic rights of the
plaintiffs.88 The economic desire of parents to provide a quality education for their children
has a moral component that perhaps permits it in part to transcend economics. One might
even argue that the goal of parents to provide a quality education for their children is
morally equivalent to the desire of parents to educate their children in a school that will
properly transmit their religious and cultural heritage. One also might argue that the
violence and lewdness that presumably pervade some public schools grossly offend the
cultural and spiritual traditions of many of the parents whose children attend these schools.
Moreover, school vouchers may help to promote the type of individual autonomy that
Pierce facilitated.89 Constitutionally, however, there is a gaping difference between
affirmatively forcing parents to send a child to a public school to which the parents have
religious objections and merely denying economically impoverished parents public funds to
send their children to a non-public school when the doors of the public school house are
wide open and welcoming.
Although the non-sectarian schools that were saved by Pierce may not have served
as similar conduits for cultural identity, the abolition of non-public schools would have given
the state a complete monopoly over elementary education, thereby truly depriving parents
of a significant choice about how to educate their children. In contrast, parents who seek to

88

See ROSS, supra note 3, at 186-88.

89

See Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity and Constitutional Theory:
Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of School Choice and the Autonomy Principle, 14 J. L. & POL.
411, 451-58 (1998).
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rescue their children from sub-standard schools and who cannot pay for private schools
have a number of public options, such as inter-district transfers, charter schools, and
political reform. Moreover, parents whose children attend under-funded schools may
obtain relief through equity funding lawsuits.
Because school vouchers involve economic issues rather than the questions of
religious freedom that were at least tacitly present in Meyer and Pierce, advocates of
school vouchers cannot avail themselves of any of the free exercise elements that are
implicit in those decisions and on which the Court might have based it rulings if it had been
ready to incorporate the First Amendment into state law.90 Moreover, since some
commentators have argued that prohibitions against public funding of sectarian schools
violates the Equal Protection Clause,91 it might not be wholly implausible to argue that
vouchers interfere with the free exercise of religion since parental disapproval of the
religious practices of parochial schools might present a wrenching dilemma for parents
whose children attend poor schools and are eligible for school vouchers. In such a
situation, the parent could face the cruel choice of leaving her child in a materially inferior
public school or sending the child to a spiritually objectionable parochial school.92

90

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.

91

Toby J. Heytens, Note, School Choice and State Constitutions, 86 VA. L. REV. 117, 14052 (2000); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the First Amendment, and State
Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 660-61 (1998).
92

See Minow, supra note 63, at 536. In discussing contracts between government and
religious organizations for the provision of welfare services pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 604(a), Professor
Minow observes that “[v]oucher programs may directly burden the right of the destitute and desperate
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Moreover, vouchers for sectarian schools would also impose disadvantages for parents
and children who resided in communities in which their own religion did not maintain a
sectarian school.93
In addition to interference with free exercise of religion by the persons for whom
vouchers were intended to assist, vouchers also could have a deleterious impact on the
religious organizations that received vouchers insofar as vouchers might enable the
government to increase its regulation of private and sectarian schools. The fear of
increased public control of private education has caused the Home School Legal Defense
Association to oppose government payments for private education. As an attorney for the
Association has explained, “vouchers have a terrible potential to disrupt existing free
market education.”94 The availability of government funds also might diminish the
willingness of parents to support private and parochial schools.95 Proponents of parochial
education should not permit vouchers to debilitate the schools that parents and churches of
the 1920s fought so valiantly to protect in Meyer and Pierce.

individuals to exercise freely their own religion or nonreligion, as the case may be.” Id.
93

See Kimberly M. DeShano, Note, Educational Vouchers and the Religion Clauses Under
Agostini: Resurrection, Insurrection and a New Direction, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 784
(1999). As Ms. DeShano points out, exclusion of sectarian schools from a voucher program would
enable the state to remain religiously neutral “as not all religions have community support to operate their
own schools.” Id. at 795.
94

Scott W. Somerville, The History and the Politics of School Choice, 10 GEO . MASON U.
CIV. RTS. L.J. 121, 124 (1999-2000).
95

See Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause, and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 807, 840-41 (1999).
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Vouchers also may violate the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.96 In
particular, vouchers seem vulnerable under the second prong of the Supreme Court’s socalled “Lemon test,” which requires that legislation challenged under the Establishment
Clause have “a primary or principal effect . . . that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”97
The Court’s recent relaxation of the Lemon test in decisions involving aid to parochial
education98 have caused some commentators to suggest that the Court might be
sympathetic toward vouchers for attendance at sectarian schools.99 Other commentators
believe that the adherence to the Court’s existing doctrines would make vouchers for
sectarian schools unconstitutional.100 The situation is further complicated because the

96

See generally, Lisa H. Thurau-Gray, Trojan Ponies: Undermining the Establishment
Clause in the Name of ‘Child Benefit Theory,’ 27 J.L. & EDUC. 435 (1998).
97

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The other prongs of the Lemon test
require that the legislation have a secular purpose and that it not create excessive entanglement between
government and religion. Id.
98

See Mitchell v. Helms, 120 S. Ct. 2530 (2000) (permitting state and federal school aid
programs to provide material and equipment to parochial schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997) (allowing public school teachers to provide remedial education to parochial school students
pursuant to federal statute); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (allowing public
school district to provide sign-language interpreter to deaf student in parochial school); Witters v.
Washington Dep’t of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1984) (permitting state to aid blind students at
sectarian college); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (sustaining state statute providing tax
deduction to parents for parochial school tuition, textbooks, and transportation).
99

See Ira C. Lupu, The Increasingly Anachronistic Case Against School Vouchers, 13
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 375, 392-97 (1999); Minow, supra note 63, at 518; Greg
Todd, Fully Participating Voucher Programs and the Wisconsin Template: A Brick or a Breach
in the Wall of Church-State Separation?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST . L. 710, 729-39 (2000).
100

See Hamilton, supra note 95; Danielle Jess Latham, Note, Wall of Separation or Path to
Interaction: The Uncertain Constitutional Future of School Vouchers in Light of Inconsistent
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Court has been closely divided in recent decisions in which it has upheld aid to parochial
schools, with four justices adhering to a strict interpretation of the second prong of the
Lemon test. The voucher issue hinges in part upon the precise manner in which voucher
plans are framed, particularly since this could determine whether the Court would regard
vouchers as a form of direct aid to parochial schools or as indirect aid to the extent that
parents had the discretion to decide whether to use the voucher for a sectarian or a nonsectarian school.101
Although the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held in 1998 that Milwaukee’s voucher
program did not violate the Establishment Clause,102 a federal court in 1999 held that
Ohio’s voucher program contravened the Establishment Clause,103 and the Supreme

Developments in Judicial Neutrality Between Church and State, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 403, 432
(2000).
101

See David S. Petron, Note, Finding Direction in Indirection: The Direct/Indirect Aid
Distinction in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1233, 1257-68
(2000); Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as Causative Agent in
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L.J. 167, 185-91 (2000); Martha McCarthy, Religion
and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?, 75 IND. L.J. 123, 160 (2000).
102

Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 997 (1998).

103

Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999). In its decision, the
court rejected several of the arguments that voucher proponents commonly make in support of the
constitutionality of vouchers. First, the court found that the program was not unconstitutional merely
because the program did not directly fund schools, but rather because it merely provided vouchers to
parents for use mainly at sectarian schools. Id. at 863. The court explained that students had “no
meaningful choice” between religious or secular schools because 82 percent of the schools that
participated in the voucher program were sectarian. Id. The court stated that it had not been influenced
in this conclusion by the fact that 96 percent of participating students had enrolled in religious schools.
Id. at 865. The court distinguished Witters, 474 U.S. 484, on the ground that "nearly all state aid
under the Voucher program will flow to religious institutions. It cannot be said that this aid flows to
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Judicial Court of Maine in 1999 sustained Maine’s exclusion of religious schools from a
voucher program on the ground that their inclusion would violate the Establishment
Clause.104
Even if vouchers are found to be constitutional under the Establishment Clause,
many state constitutions present impediments to vouchers. The Supreme Court of
Vermont has held that a state voucher program violated the state’s equivalent of the
Establishment Clause.105 A Florida court recently held that Florida’s voucher plan violated
a state constitutional provision that requires the state to provide “a uniform, efficient, safe,
secure and high quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high
quality education.”106 According to the Florida decision, the voucher program “supplants
the system of free public schools mandated by the constitution.”107 Other state

those institutions as a result of the choice of the Program beneficiaries since nearly all the schools
participating are religious." 72 F. Supp. 2d at 855-56.
The court in Zelman also distinguished the Supreme Court's 1992 decisions in Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993), and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), on
the ground that the Ohio program, unlike the federal programs in Agostini and Zobrest, resulted in the
receipt of actual funds by the sectarian schools. 72 F. Supp. 2d at 857-60. Moreover, the court
emphasized that the Ohio program imposed no limits on the manner in which the funds were to be used.
Id.
104

Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep’t, 728 A.2d 127 (Me. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 364

(1999).
105

Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Department of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999), cert.
denied sub nom. Andrews v. Vermont Dep’t of Educ., 120 S. Ct. 626 (1999).
106

Holmes v. Bush, No. CV99-3370, 2000 WL 526364 at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 14, 2000)
(citing to FLA . CONST . art. IX § 1).
107

Id. at *7.
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constitutions contain significant prohibitions against public funding of sectarian schools,108
and many states enforce their own establishment clauses more restrictively than the federal
clause is enforced by the federal courts.109 One study has concluded that the states are
roughly equally divided into three groups: those that have a supportive constitutional
environment for school vouchers, those that have an unsupportive climate, and those in
which the outcome would be uncertain.110 The Supreme Court’s growing emphasis on
federalism indicates that the Court would defer to state prohibitions on vouchers if the
issue were framed primarily in terms of the Establishment Clause rather than the Free
Exercise Clause.111
A state could, of course, exclude sectarian schools from a voucher program.
Although some commentators have suggested that such an exclusion might run afoul of the
Equal Protection or Free Exercise Clauses,112 the invalidation of such a statute on either

108

Frank R. Kemerer, The Constitutional Dimension of School Vouchers, 3 TEX . F. ON
CIV. LIB. & CIV. RTS. 137, 162-71 (1998). For example, most state constitutions require that all
“public mon[ey] . . . be spent for a public purpose,” and several state constitutions specifically require
that only public schools receive public money. Id. at 169; 168. See also Deshano, supra note 93, at
778.
109

See DeShano, supra note 93; Kemerer, supra note 108.

110

Kemerer, supra note 108, at 179.

111

Id. at 151-53.

112

See Stephen L. Carter, Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture: Parents, Religion, and Schools:
Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1218 (1997) (“if the state
decides to give aid to any private schools at all, to exclude religious schools would be to do just what
Pierce does not allow: to pressure parents (through the device of a financial penalty) to send their
children to the religion-destroying schools rather than the religion-affirming ones.”); Heytens, supra note
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ground “would reverse a trend by the present U.S. Supreme Court to give greater
deference to state authority.”113 Moreover, the exclusion of sectarian schools from a
voucher program would enable the state to avoid favoring those denominations that have
community support for sectarian schools at the expense of those which lack such
support.114 In its recent decision striking down Cleveland’s voucher program, the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio refused to address the state’s contention that
it would be unconstitutional to exclude religious schools from a voucher program.115
Congress might try to circumvent such state impediments by enacting a federal school
voucher statute. Such a statute might “trump the application of state constitutional antiestablishment provisions in state court under the federal Supremacy Clause.” 116
Vouchers are antithetical to the spirit of Pierce insofar as they interfere with the
delicate balance between public and private education that lies at the core of that decision.
The Court in Pierce tacitly rejected the contention of proponents of compulsory public

91 at 153-61 (arguing that exclusion of religious schools from a voucher system would violate equal
protection); Mark Tushnet, supra note 20, at 51 (“[s]uch an exclusion appears to violate the
fundamental principle of the religion clauses that a government may not discriminate in favor of or against
religion in its provision of benefits.”).
113

Kemerer, supra note 108, at 152. Professor Kemerer believes that “past decisions suggest
that the U.S. Supreme Court may allow states to apply their own constitutional provisions to challenged
voucher programs in the interest of federalism.” Id. at 179.
114

See DeShano, supra note 93, at 795.

115

Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834, 860-61 (1999).

116

Kemerer, supra note 108, at 152.
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education that private schools threatened the viability of public education. As opponents of
compulsory public education pointed out during the school wars of the early 1920s, nonpublic schools helped the public schools insofar as they relieved the state from finding
extra funds to educate large numbers of students.117 Although Pierce implicitly recognized
that the private and parochial schools posed no threat to the state that would justify the
state’s exercise of its police power to destroy these schools, the Court’s opinion in no way
denigrated public education. Indeed, even opponents of compulsory public education
seemed to assume that public education represented the norm and non-public education
the exception – a constitutionally protected and healthy exception, but an exception
nonetheless.
In contrast, many proponents of vouchers seem hostile to the very concept of public
education,118 just as the advocates of the compulsory public education law that the Court
nullified in Pierce were hostile to any form of private elementary education. Many voucher
advocates accept the highly questionable premises that public schools tend to be inferior
to private ones,119 that poor public schools cannot be improved, and that vouchers would

117

ROSS, supra note 3, at 144, 156. Opponents of the Oregon school law, for example,
variously estimated that the state would need between 3.6 and 6 million dollars to construct new schools
if the statute were upheld, and that the annual cost of educating the 12,000 new pupils would exceed
one million dollars (about 30 million dollars in today’s money). Id. at 156.
118

See Molly Townes O’Brien, Private School Tuition Vouchers and the Realities of Racial
Politics, 64 TENN. L. REV. 359, 406-07, passim (1997).
119

See, e.g., DAVID C. BERLINER & BRUCE J. BIDDLE, THE MANUFACTURED CRISIS: MYTHS,
FRAUDS, AND THE ATTACK ON AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 26 (1995); KEVIN B. SMITH &
KENNETH J. MEIER, THE CASE AGAINST SCHOOL CHOICE: POLITICS, MARKETS, AND FOOLS 15-16
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help raise educational standards.120 In its decisions in Meyer and Pierce, the Court tacitly
rejected similar arguments about private schools, for antagonists of the parochial schools
had complained about low standards in such schools. Although some of these complaints
were justified,121 others were wildly exaggerated,122 just as many of the criticisms of
today’s public schools may be overwrought. By emphasizing that the state had the power
to regulate private education in order to require the maintenance of certain standards, the
Court in Pierce implied that any deficiencies in private schools did not alone permit the
state to require compulsory public education.

(1995).
120

Lynn Olson, New Studies on Private Choice Fan the Flames, EDUC. WK., Sept. 4,
1996, at 1, 20 (citing conflicting studies regarding performance of students who used vouchers in
Milwaukee program); Adam Cohen, A First Report Card on Vouchers, TIME, Apr. 26, 1999, at 36
(discussing Indiana University study that concluded that students who used vouchers to attend
established private schools slightly outperformed comparable public school students, while students who
attended schools that had been established for the purpose of accepting vouchers had performance
levels inferior to public school counterparts).
121

ROSS, supra note 3, at 48, 78, 102, 140-41. In Michigan, for example, where voters in
1920 and 1924 rejected compulsory public education laws, “[t]he Roman Catholic schools had no
superintendent until 1918, and administration continued to be weak for many years thereafter since the
superintendent had no office or staff and served also as a parish priest.” Id. at 141. Deploring the
deficiencies in some of the Lutheran schools in Michigan in 1918, a Lutheran “pastor remarked that it
was ‘small wonder’ that public school officials were ‘not always friendly towards our school system.’”
Id. (quoting H. Grueber to Theodore Graebner, Oct. 2, 1918, Graebner Papers, Box 122, Concordia
Historical Institute, Clayton Missouri).
122

In advocating compulsory public education during the early 1920s, a Florida public school
teacher argued that any public savings produced by parochial schools were “more than counterbalanced
by increased public spending for ‘the children’s homes, . . . charity hospitals, insane asylums, courts of
justice and prisons’ that were needed to accommodate parochial school alumni.” ROSS, supra note 3,
at 70 (quoting Walter B. Jernigan, Public Schools in Florida, NEW AGE, Jan. 1923, at 16).
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Moreover, some advocates of vouchers argue that public schools are presently so
stratified by race and income that they no longer effectively transmit the civic values that the
advocates of the common school movement foresaw during the nineteenth century.
Analogous arguments about private schools were made before Pierce by advocates of
compulsory public education, who argued that non-public schools created deleterious
racial, religious, and economic stratifications.123
Despite the diversity of an increasingly heterogeneous society, it is still possible to
identify core values to which the overwhelming majority of parents appear willing to
subscribe.124 To the extent that Americans disagree about values, they are more likely to
disagree about the manner in which core values should be applied in specific situations
rather than about the values themselves. For example, while nearly everyone would agree
that children should respect their parents, there is considerable disagreement about the
methods by which parents may discipline children who fail to respect their parents.

123

ROSS, supra note 3, at 71.

124

Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values: Listening to the Voices
of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 169, 225 (1996). As Professor Salomone has explained:
[a]lthough not intended to be exhaustive, a listing of common values might include a mix
of character traits such as honesty, integrity, responsibility, delayed gratification, hard
work, respect for authority, and civic virtue combined with more fundamental political
principles, particularly justice and fairness, political and religious tolerance, and equality
in the sense of equal dignity for all. As a source of these “shared values,” we should
look to our common history and particularly to the United States Constitution, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, and to federal statutory law with supporting
administrative regulations as statements of majority consensus.
Id.

42

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol34/iss1/6

42

Ross: Parental Rights Issues Involving Education

Similarly, while nearly everyone values the virtue of hard work, reasonable persons may
differ about the extent to which food stamps given to the poor or inheritance taxes imposed
on the rich encourage or discourage this virtue.
Some critics of public education also contend that the public schools fail to instill
virtues, even to the extent that it remains possible to identify such virtues. Notwithstanding
their shortcomings, however, public schools still help to transmit basic values and to
promote social cohesion.125 Any deficiencies in fulfilling this mission does not mean that
public schools are incapable of improvement. As one commentator has aptly stated: “The
cry of ‘Fire!’ has been heard in the institution of public education. Exit should not be the
only option. Instead of devoting all resources to finding an exit, the public should find a way
to extinguish the fire and to preserve a worthy and venerable structure.”126

125

As Professor Dupre argued recently:
[o]ne of the great strengths of the public school institution is its ability to
encourage social integration. Indeed, this nation may have no other institution
with the same potential of integrating rich and poor on a daily basis and
inculcating our commitment to representative democracy while children are
young and before they become set in their views. Learning to deal with, and
perhaps even be friends with, children of a different economic, racial, or
religious background can be an enriching experience for children.

Anne Proffitt Dupre, A Study in Double Standards, Discipline, and the Disabled Student, 75 WASH .
L. REV. 1, 84 (2000).
126

Note, The Hazards of Making Public Schools a Private Business, 112 HARV. L. REV.
695, 712 (1999). This commentator has likewise aptly pointed out that the possibility that “the public
schools are not meeting the ideal” does not necessarily mean “that the ideal is a bad one.” Id. at 710.
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Although advocates of vouchers contend that the transfer of money away from
supposedly inferior public schools will encourage public schools to raise their standards,
vouchers could have precisely the opposite effect. Vouchers could relieve public officials
of political pressure to improve sub-standard schools since they would reduce the number
of students attending substandard schools and remove from the public schools the very
students whose parents would be the most likely to seek public school reform.127
Moreover, the competition argument is flawed insofar as private schools enjoy certain
competitive advantages over public schools, particularly their far more arbitrary power over
the selection and retention of students.128

127

As Professor Minow has pointed out, “[t]he immediate consequence of school-choice
programs will most likely leave the most vulnerable children from the least-engaged and least-solid
families in the worst schools.” Minow, supra note 63, at 528. Likewise, one opponent of school
vouchers has aptly expressed fear that public schools would be “left only with children with disabilities,
children of parents who do not care if, or where, their children attend and children who have been
kicked out of all the private schools.” Jennifer A. Hendrikson, Comment, Jackson v. Benson: School
Vouchers – Offering an Apple to Private Schools; Creating a Serpent for Public Schools, 75
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 259, 277 (1999) (quoting an opponent of an Oklahoma voucher proposal). See
also James S. Liebman, Voice, Not Choice, 101 YALE L.J. 259, 277-93 (1991)(reviewing JOHN E.
CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICAN SCHOOLS (1990)).
128

As one commentator has pointed out, the public choice theory is flawed because:
the public and private schools are not equal in terms of public accountability.
The public schools must not only adhere to curriculum standards and antidiscrimination practices, but public schools must also admit every student that
wishes to attend. On the other hand, private schools are less accountable to the
community. Thus, they have more power to choose who to educate.

Hendrikson, supra note 127, at 277.
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Advocates of vouchers have also failed to explain what will become of public school
systems that have lost the support of the parents who presumably care most about their
children’s education. As one leading sociologist of education has predicted, “In any choice
plan, the families who have the least resources in terms of information, energy and money
will be left behind.”129 Moreover, it is unlikely that states will have the means to fund
vouchers for every parent who wishes to receive one.130
The slogan of the opponents of compulsory public education during the early 1920s
was “Whose is the Child?,” a question to which the Court in Pierce provided an answer that
struck a somewhat ambiguous balance between the rights of the parents and the rights of
the state. Perhaps the rallying cry of opponents of school vouchers should be “Education
is not a commodity.” It is erroneous to assume that education is amenable to normal
market forces. As Professor Liebman has explained, “[o]ne thing markets are not good for
is allocating public goods, and an educated public is just that. Accordingly, exit and choice
will never work well to allocate that good – unless working well means warehousing the
poor, the less gifted, and the academically disinclined in educational facilities that make
existing public schools look like the Institute for Advanced Studies.”131

129

Jill Jasperson, Renaissance in Education: The Constitutionality and Viability of an
Educational Choice or Voucher System, 1993 B.Y.U EDUC. & L.J. 126, 146 (1993) (quoting
Robert L. Crain, a professor of sociology and education at Columbia University Teachers College).
130

See Timothy D. Lynch, Note, Education as a Fundamental Right: Challenging the
Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 953, 969 (1998).
131

Liebman, supra note 127, at 313. Decrying school vouchers as “recipe for disaster,”
Professor Liebman argues that voucher plans, regardless of how they are designed, “inevitably will turn
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The use of Meyer and Pierce by both the proponents and opponents of school
vouchers illustrates again that these decisions remain enigmatic, controversial, and vital.
Both decisions compel significant restrictions on the power of the state to interfere with the
autonomy of parents over the education of their children. Both decisions also recognize
that the state has significant power to regulate the manner in which children are educated.
The decisions therefore must remain controversial in the absence of pure communism or
pure libertarianism, for there is no obvious or perfect way to balance the competing
interests of the parents and the state in matters of education in a free, but statist, society. In
trying to achieve this balance, one might recall W.H. Auden’s observation that civilization is
a function of “the degree of diversity attained and the degree of unity retained.”132 Parental
rights involving the education of their children help to promote a diversity that is essential to
a free society, but the retention of governmental authority in this process helps to assure a
unity that is no less essential.

the schools into new and more efficient machines for sorting educational consumers into numerous
homogenized pools of parents and children with the same levels of wealth, intellectual ability, consumer
sophistication, academic orientation, and ethnicity. That, after all, is what markets are good for.” Id.
132

W.H. AUDEN , FOREWARDS AND AFTERWARDS 9 (1973).
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